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Abstract 17 
We test how fast and slow thought processes affect cooperation for sustainability by 18 
manipulating time pressure in a dynamic common pool resource experiment. Sustainable 19 
management of shared resources critically depends on decisions in the current period to leave 20 
enough stock so that future generations are able to draw upon the remaining limited natural 21 
resources. An intertemporal common pool resource game represents a typical dynamic for social 22 
dilemmas involving natural resources. Using one such game, we analyse decisions throughout 23 
time. We find that people in this context deplete the common resource to a greater extent under 24 
time pressure, which leads to greater likelihood of stock collapse. Preventing resource collapse 25 
while managing natural resources requires actively creating decision environments that facilitate 26 
the cognitive capacity needed to support sustainable cooperation. 27 
 28 
Overextraction of natural resources in the present can lead to negative consequences for society 29 
and is at odds with most definitions of sustainable development (1). According to Pearson (2), 30 
"the core of the idea of sustainability is the concept that current decisions should not damage 31 
prospects for maintaining or improving living standards in the future.” Essential for 32 
sustainability and important to many aspects of human and animal behaviour (3-6) is 33 
cooperation. Societies with imperfect, incomplete, and shared property rights face social 34 
dilemmas characterized by conflict between individual and collective interests. Cooperative 35 
solutions in social dilemmas require individuals to overcome selfish myopic incentives to 36 
achieve better social outcomes. Across many social dilemmas, myopic resource use often yields 37 
immediate, tangible, and easy to understand benefits; while long-term cooperative and 38 
sustainable stewardship of the resource involves more thought, planning, and coordination, along 39 
with benefits that are less certain and harder to calculate (7). Understanding how cognitive 40 
pressures influence common pool resource (CPR) outcomes is vital for designing interventions to 41 
prevent resource collapse and support sustainable collective decision processes.  42 
Effective stewardship of the commons requires understanding how institutions and 43 
cognitive factors contribute to cooperation.  An expansive literature considers which institutions 44 
can establish cooperation in CPRs and why these institutions work (8-12). While institutions 45 
have been rigorously explored in relation to CPRs, less is known about what cognitive factors 46 
and decision environments produce sustainable cooperation in CPRs.  One particularly salient 47 
question is: do fast (intuitive) or slow (deliberative) thought processes better support sustainable 48 
use of a common pool resource? We find experimental evidence that groups drawing on a 49 
common pool resource are less likely to cooperate under time pressure. Instead, a slower, more 50 
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deliberative, decision process supports cooperation which extends the life of the common pool 51 
resource and improves social welfare.   52 
Our experiment uses time pressure manipulation on an intertemporal CPR. While much 53 
of the previous experimental work on social dilemmas and cognition has focused on one-shot 54 
games, natural resources are often characterized as stock variables (ex. wetlands, fisheries, 55 
groundwater) which are not independent of human behaviour in previous periods. These natural 56 
assets also cannot be easily regenerated if collapse occurs. By tracking a stock of resources in 57 
our experiment we can evaluate when group behaviour causes collapse of the resource which is 58 
paramount in understanding sustainable development, the reconciliation of society’s goals and 59 
the limits of the earth’s natural resources (13,14). We have found only one other intertemporal 60 
experiment using time pressure which examines intertemporal preferences (15) and no previous 61 
experiments involving intertemporal social dilemmas and cognitive manipulations, such as time 62 
pressure. The dynamic CPR game we employ allows us to determine how cognitive scarcity, that 63 
is present in each decision time frame, impacts the depletion and survival of shared stocks over 64 
time.  Our experiment further tests whether fast and slow thought processes behave similarly in 65 
dynamic CPRs to one-shot social dilemmas. 66 
Common pool resource decisions – and resource decisions in general – are frequently 67 
made by individuals who face cognitive constraints. For example, the condition of poverty 68 
inhibits farmers’ ability to make good decisions due to cognitive resources being consumed by 69 
financial concerns, an equivalent of losing 13 IQ points (16). Risks from the natural system, such 70 
as weather variability and droughts, also tax mental resources (17). Recent research suggests that 71 
scarcities of time and money focus our cognitive system on these particular scarcities, leaving 72 
little cognitive bandwidth left to solve other problems (18-20). This may make an escape from 73 
poverty more difficult, as the condition of poverty causes poor communities to heavily discount 74 
future consequences of extraction behaviour: cognitive scarcities contribute to poverty traps (21).  75 
One efficient strategy when faced with cognitive constraints is to apply heuristics, fast and 76 
simple rules, which simplify the decision environment. These strategies adopted by subjects in 77 
dynamic CPRs under limited cognitive resources could have important implications to the 78 
sustainability of natural resources.   79 
It is common for experimenters to use time pressure to shine a light on the innate thought 80 
processes of individuals. As a cognitive constraint, time pressure is used to distinguish between 81 
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fast instinctive strategies and slow deliberative strategies in the dual process theory of cognition 82 
(22-26). Through applying time pressure to participants’ decisions we can determine if fast, 83 
instinctive strategies are more sustainable than slow, deliberative ones.   84 
There are two types of cooperation in a game theoretic setting: pure cooperation, which is 85 
cooperation when defection strictly maximizes payoffs (ex. one-shot social dilemma games), and 86 
strategic cooperation, which is cooperation that can be long-run payoff maximizing (ex. 87 
coordination games). Previous studies find evidence of increased cooperation under time 88 
pressure in one-shot social dilemmas (27-30). This increased cooperation can be explained by a 89 
dual process theory of cognition called the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) (5,6,31). SHH 90 
predicts that deliberation can undermine pure cooperation but may support strategic cooperation 91 
if the context is sensitive for intuitive thought processes (31,32). A recent meta-study (30) finds 92 
evidence for the prediction of increased cooperation in social dilemmas when people rely more 93 
on intuitive thought processes and finds no effects on cooperation of cognitive manipulation (ex. 94 
time pressure or cognitive load) in games with the potential of future benefits. Though, there is a 95 
recent study finding decreased cooperation under time pressure which is attributed to confusion 96 
(33). According to SHH, deliberation would either have no effect or increase cooperation in our 97 
setting because cooperation can be payoff maximizing over the life of the common pool 98 
resource, similar to a coordination game. Since none of the time pressure studies to date include 99 
intertemporal games our experiment adds new evidence of cooperative behaviour of individuals 100 
subjected to cognitive scarcities.      101 
Utilizing a between-subject comparison test (between participants under time pressure 102 
and participants without a time constraint) we find participants behave more myopically when 103 
limited by time constraints, which is consistent with SHH. Thus, common pool resources have a 104 
higher probability of failure when managed by people under cognitive scarcities, a finding which 105 
contrasts the findings from previous time pressure experiments. We explore three potential 106 
reasons for this result which include: errors in judgment (34,35), slow adjustment of extraction 107 
strategies during the game (36), and intuitive heuristics for myopic extraction (5,6,31). Our 108 
results highlight the benefits of examining intertemporal dynamics over one-shot games to 109 
understand how cognition and cooperation unfolds to promote sustainable development. 110 
 111 
Dynamic CPR Model 112 
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There are numerous economic experiments with dynamic CPRs that investigate different 113 
institutions which propagate cooperation (37,38). Our experiment uses a dynamic CPR model 114 
used by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (39). This model considers an inexhaustible private 115 
resource and an exhaustible shared resource. Socially optimal resource exploitation in this game 116 
requires drawing heavily from the shared resource early and preserving it as time passes. In each 117 
period, n players simultaneously remove tokens from an inexhaustible private account and a 118 
shared exhaustible group account with the constraint that only 60 tokens in total can be taken in a 119 
period. Tokens from the group account are worth twice as much as tokens from the individual 120 
account. Each group member i chooses the number of tokens to extract, ݁௜௧, from the group 121 
account at time t. The sum of the group members extraction is ܧ௧ = ∑ ݁௜௧௡௜ୀଵ . The group account 122 
acts as the stock of a common pool resource in the experiment and the private account acts as the 123 
opportunity cost of extraction.  124 
The group account replenishes at a rate, β, each period, multiplied by the difference 125 
between the remaining group account balance and a maximum size of the group account, ݓഥ . 126 
Thus the group account, ݓ௧, evolves over time according to the following formula: ݓ௧ = ݓ௧ିଵ −127 
ܧ௧ିଵ + ߚ(ݓഥ − ݓ௧ିଵ − ܧ௧ିଵ). The size of the group account in the present period directly 128 
depends on the size of the group account in the past round and the decisions made by group 129 
members in that round. To realize regrowth of the group account, groups must maintain a group 130 
account level above a threshold, ߬. Whenever the group account is reduced below this threshold 131 
there ceases to be any regrowth in the group account and the resource collapses.  In our 132 
experiment β was set at 0.25, the minimum threshold, ߬, was set equal to 30 tokens, and ݓഥ  was 133 
set to 360 tokens. 134 
We parameterize a relatively small regrowth rate in our experiment so that the 135 
symmetrical Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is to exhaust the resource as fast as 136 
possible though gains for the group can be higher if they do not exhaust the resource. The 137 
socially optimal strategy in this game is to maintain the group account indefinitely to prevent the 138 
collapse of the group account. The path of the socially optimal extraction depends on the 139 
parameters of the experiment and consists of a set of group account dependent choice rules, 140 
detailed in the Methods section.  141 
This model describes situations where societies discover a virgin resource, extract much 142 
of it, and then attempt to jointly conserve the remaining resource. The presence of a threshold, 143 
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below which the stock will not regenerate, is also a pillar of ecological theory (40) and is 144 
descriptive of many real-world common pool resource dilemmas. 145 
 146 
Results 147 
 148 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average group account (stock) size for time pressure and 149 
non-time pressure groups. The lower stock path of time pressure groups indicates greater 150 
extraction and lower survival rates of group accounts in the time pressure treatments as 151 
compared to those under no time pressure. This suggests that time pressure leads to less 152 
cooperation and shorter survival of the common resource.  153 
We use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the treatment effect of time pressure 154 
on the probability of failure of the group account.  This method of survival analysis is commonly 155 
employed in medical research to measure causal effects on the probability of an event, such as 156 
death or relapse, and in economics and political science to evaluate duration data (41-44). The 157 
model is appropriate to analyse the event of failure of the group account in our experiment since 158 
the timing of collapse is a type of duration data.  159 
 Analysis at the individual level in Table 1 suggests an effect from the imposition of time 160 
pressure (group level analysis is provided in Supplementary Table 1). We find that individuals 161 
exposed to time pressure face an increased rate of failure of 101.3% (2.013 = ݁଴.଻଴଴, ݌ < 0.01) 162 
over the control group in Table 1, column 2.  This is sometimes referred to as the hazard ratio in 163 
survival analysis studies. A similar pattern is present for individual differences in Cognitive 164 
Reflection Test (CRT). An increase in correctly answered CRT questions reduced the rate of 165 
group account failure by 79% (p<0.05). The coefficient on the percentage of CRT questions 166 
answered correctly indicates that participants who do not repress their intuitive thought process 167 
induce a greater probability of failure of the group account.  This finding is also consistent with 168 
the average treatment effects of time pressure. The rate of increase in hazard ratio is roughly 169 
equivalent across time periods with the difference in hazard ratios being proportional, which is 170 
an important assumption in the Cox proportional hazards model.  The results suggest that time 171 
pressure significantly increases the failure rate of the group account in the intertemporal CPR 172 
game which adds a different finding from much of the existing literature on cooperation and 173 
intuitive decisions in one-shot social dilemmas. 174 
  175 
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Extraction Behaviour  176 
We also explain the effect of time pressure on the deviation of observed extraction from the 177 
optimal extraction behaviour (ܵ݋݈݈ܿ݅ܽݕ	ܱ݌ݐ݈݅݉ܽ	ܧݔݐݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ − ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܧݔݐݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊). We 178 
analyse this difference in extraction behaviour because the socially optimal extraction path is 179 
group account dependent and incorporates the level of the group account as a decision making 180 
variable that is nonlinearly related to extraction decisions.  Using a simpler extraction measure, 181 
like the number of group tokens extracted, may be misleading as participants adjust to changing 182 
group account levels across rounds of the game. In the following analysis we only include rounds 183 
of the game before exhaustion of the group account since the observed behaviour after 184 
exhaustion is trivial.  185 
 In Table 2 we find that time pressure induces greater extraction of the resource.  A 186 
negative coefficient indicates the variable increases extraction relative to the social optimal, 187 
which in turn would increase the relative risk of collapse of the resource. The treatment effect is 188 
statistically weak without any controls, which suggests the time within game is important to the 189 
size of the treatment effect. As a robustness check, the SI reports results including subjects and 190 
groups who violated the time limit to test whether results are explained by systematic differences 191 
between the participants who meet the time constraint versus those who do not (Supplementary 192 
Table 3). In some one-shot games there is a loss of support for intuitive cooperation when 193 
including these participants. We find attenuated estimates of our treatment effect with the 194 
inclusion of subjects who violate the time limit. We also take a further look at round differences 195 
in Supplementary Table 4. The coefficient on time pressure is negative though the coefficient on 196 
CRT score is not statistically significant. Combined with our survival analyses (Table 1) and 197 
Supplementary Tables 2, 3, and 4, this gives us some confidence that the cognitive scarcities in 198 
the dynamic common pool resource game induce less cooperative behaviour and increase the 199 
risk of group account failure through greater myopic extraction.   200 
 201 
Discussion 202 
 Our results indicate one domain in which intuitive judgment under limited cognitive 203 
resources leads to more myopic behaviour, to the detriment of the individual and group welfare. 204 
We find in an intertemporal social dilemma game, participants with cognitive scarcities have a 205 
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propensity to extract more from a shared resource stock. This result provides empirical evidence 206 
of when individuals are deliberatively cooperative, which has previously drawn almost 207 
exclusively on static social dilemma experiments (5,27,28). In an intertemporal setting, 208 
individuals require the cognitive bandwidth for sustainable management of the resource, and 209 
deliberation supports cooperation in this setting.  210 
 Since many common pool resource situations are intertemporal in nature, our results are 211 
more germane to these contexts than those of traditional one-shot games (27,28). Such one-shot 212 
games are limited in their ability to capture the development of intertemporal dynamics, which 213 
can have large impacts on sustainable development. In one-shot games the logical action is to 214 
extract as much as possible. However, in intertemporal games with repeated interactions 215 
cooperating in maintaining the resource becomes a more viable strategy (45); a phenomenon 216 
which helps explain the success of some common pool resource management programs (46). So 217 
it is interesting that the imposition of time pressure decreases the probability of survival of group 218 
accounts in our experiment, which suggests these CPR success stories were in spite of intuitively 219 
myopic behaviour. 220 
  We explore three potential reasons for the contrast between our results and those of prior 221 
static non-cooperative games. The first possibility is that people make more mistakes when 222 
confronted with a difficult problem under time pressure (34, 35). Such stochastic mistakes may 223 
increase the variance in play from participants and the group account may be inadvertently 224 
exhausted. To evaluate the variation in extraction behaviour we compare the absolute value of 225 
the deviation of extraction decisions between rounds (ܣܾݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁	ܦ݁ݒ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊ = |	݁௜,௧ − ݁௜,௧ିଵ| ) in 226 
Supplementary Figure 1. A greater value of the absolute deviation from the time pressure 227 
treatment would indicate that stochastic behaviour, or random mistakes, may play some role in 228 
additional failure of groups in the survival analysis.  Our results suggest that stochasticity in 229 
choice is similar between time pressure treatments.  This however does not suggest that other 230 
mean shifting errors in extraction do not exist. 231 
  A second explanation for the departure from past one-shot game results is that the design 232 
of the game encourages large extraction decisions at the beginning of the game and cooperation 233 
requires restraining extraction behaviour once the group account nears the threshold for failure. 234 
The initial extraction behaviour could induce inertia in participants under time pressure leading 235 
to a slower adaptation to optimal levels of extraction. Alós-Ferrer et al. (36) found that inertia as 236 
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an automatic process conflicts with a more rational deliberative one, consistent with the dual 237 
process view of decision making. We can use the change in extraction behaviour to analyse 238 
inertia as well as variance in individual extraction behaviour. A smaller absolute value of the 239 
difference in extraction decisions indicates greater inertia in extraction decisions. We find no 240 
difference in inertia between time pressure treatments, which puts serious doubts on inertia as an 241 
explanation for increased extraction and greater failure of CPRs (Supplementary Figure 1). 242 
 A third explanation, the main hypothesis for interpretation of these results, is that the 243 
dynamic aspect of the game affects intuitive cooperation among subjects. The data from our 244 
experiment supports the proposition of quick and fast myopic behaviour in the commons. Our 245 
finding is consistent with the SHH (5,6), wherein deliberation can sometimes increase 246 
cooperation in settings where cooperating can be a long run payoff-maximizing strategy. Such an 247 
increase in cooperation can be favored by natural selection or learning – and thus is expected to 248 
occur – if cooperation is typically long-run advantageous and intuition is sufficiently sensitive to 249 
context (31), or if most interactions are one-shot and the distribution of deliberation 250 
costs satisfies certain conditions (32).  Deliberation promotes cooperation when it leads people to 251 
attend to the features of the dynamic CPR which realize cooperation as a more efficient 252 
strategy.  If people only really confront the nature of the collapsing resource when they have 253 
time, deliberation would override myopic impulses.   254 
 Many decisions in our society can be characterized as dynamic choices under cognitive 255 
scarcities. Our research provides insights into instinctive human behaviour, enabling us to shed 256 
light on whether humans behave more myopically under temporally dynamic common pool 257 
resource scenarios with quick and fast decision processes. This may well mean that cooperation 258 
in the commons is more difficult to sustain because of intuitively myopic behaviour and the use 259 
of policy tools becomes even more important to combat over-extraction in the commons. It is 260 
also unclear how to provide the cognitive bandwidth necessary to support cooperative behaviour 261 
since it can be presented through a combination of factors, though efforts to mitigate these 262 
stressors for individuals operating in a common pool resource context could provide an 263 
important support tool to sustainable collective management. 264 
 The results also highlight the implications of generalizing results of one-shot games to 265 
situations that involve intertemporal trade-offs, or repeat interactions, when considering 266 
sustainability.  One-shot games are poor substitutes for dynamic games when exploring cognitive 267 
 
 
10
processes of human behaviour and sustainability. To evaluate the importance of deliberation in 268 
thought processes to cooperation in common pool resources more aspects of these games need to 269 
be explored.  Specifically, there is a need to investigate how group size, uncertainty in natural 270 
systems, and institutions affect the cognitive thought processes and cooperation to support 271 
sustainable management. 272 
 273 
Methods 274 
 275 
Data  276 
A total of 120 undergraduate students were recruited at a public university in the northeastern 277 
United States and paid based on their performance in the game. Participants played three cycles 278 
of the intertemporal CPR game in the Spring and Fall of 2016, a cycle is one set of rounds of the 279 
same CPR game with the same group.  In each cycle, a participant extracted tokens from a group 280 
account shared with 3 other anonymous participants (a representative decision screen is shown in 281 
Supplementary Figure 4). The last round (decision period) in each game was randomly 282 
predetermined and not communicated to the participants to avoid last round effects. Participants 283 
were randomly and anonymously regrouped after each cycle into a new group.  284 
Participants received a show-up fee of $10 and the average payout at the end of the game 285 
was $18.70. The payout was based on each individual token taken from the private account 286 
yielding a return of 0.8 cents while the tokens taken from the public account yielded 1.6 cents 287 
each. The economic experiment software Z-tree (47) was used to run the experiment. There were 288 
three cycles in the experiment with a predetermined fixed length; the first cycle lasted 12 rounds, 289 
the second cycle lasted 15 rounds, and the third cycle lasted 8 rounds. Participants were not told 290 
how many rounds to expect or that there would be multiple cycles during the experiment. 291 
Prior to the game, participants answered a three question Cognitive Reflection Test 292 
(CRT) (shown in Supplementary Figure 3) under a 90 second time constraint (48). The Cognitive 293 
Reflection Test can determine whether participants can suppress an intuitive answer which uses 294 
little conscious deliberation (“System 1” spontaneous, intuitive thinking) and employ a slower 295 
and more reflective cognitive process (“System 2” processes requiring mental effort and 296 
reasoning) when making decisions. If a subject did not answer all three of the CRT questions 297 
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before the end of the 90 seconds then they were recorded as having not finished the CRT and as 298 
having answered none of the questions correct. 299 
In addition to the CRT, participants answered demographic questions (as shown in 300 
Supplementary Figure 2). Next participants were given instructions about the dynamic CPR 301 
game (a representative copy of these instructions is provided in the Supplementary Information). 302 
The experimenter read the instructions to the participants, who were required to correctly answer 303 
3 comprehension questions to confirm their understanding of the game. Experience with other 304 
economic experiments, time to complete the comprehension questions, CRT scores, gender 305 
ratios, and areas of study of the subjects were similar between treatment and control groups.  306 
Indicators for whether a participant was majoring in environmental economics or biology were 307 
included because of the potential for effects from their educational program of choice on their 308 
decisions. 309 
The participants in half of the experimental sessions were exposed to time pressure 310 
constraints with a 7-second per round decision time limit. This constraint was chosen because the 311 
decision times of subjects within sessions without time pressure indicated that it would be a 312 
binding constraint for the majority of them. There was a clock visible to subjects counting down 313 
the time and the decision screen disappeared after the 7-second limit was reached. Time pressure 314 
was instituted by requiring participants to make extraction decisions within 7-seconds, and if the 315 
time constraint was violated then the participants earned zero tokens (public or private) for that 316 
round. When subjects violate the 7-second time limit no tokens are taken from the group account 317 
for that subject. To ensure differences in extraction decisions are active choices rather than 318 
inaction, 31 out of 2,440 observations where subjects do not make a decision within the time 319 
constraint are excluded in the analysis. Similarly, 16 out of 90 groups with a subject who did not 320 
enter an extraction decision within the time constraint are excluded from the survival analysis so 321 
that any interdependency between that zero-extraction observation and overall survival is not 322 
biased. Most participants in sessions without a time constraint took longer to make a decision 323 
than the time constraint would have permitted (indicating the 7-second time constraint was 324 
binding on average); we find the difference in mean decision time between treatment and control 325 
groups is statistically significant at the 1% level using a Mann-Whitney two sample statistic test.   326 
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We employ a series of statistical tests to estimate the treatment effect of time pressure 327 
and the effect of greater CRT scores on cooperative behaviour to understand the cognitive 328 
underpinnings of cooperation in a dynamic CPR. 329 
In the model for the dynamic game, the size of the group account (stock) in the present 330 
period directly depends on the size of the group stock in the past period and the decisions made 331 
by group members in the past period. In our experiment β was set at 0.25 and, ߬, was set at a 332 
stock size of 30 tokens (if the stock size fell below 30 tokens, the group account would not 333 
regenerate lost tokens).  334 
There exists a myopic strategy in this game which is the Subgame Perfect Nash 335 
Equilibrium (SPNE), wherein each player extracts the maximum amount until the group account 336 
is depleted. In the SPNE, forward-looking individual agents consider the trade-off between 337 
assured present benefits and uncertain future benefits (measured in terms of tokens extracted 338 
from the group account). This SPNE depends on the parameters of the experiment, primarily the 339 
relative values of ߚ, ߬, and n.  Specifically, when ߚ < ఛ(௡ିଵ)௪ഥିఛ  , or regrowth of the resource is 340 
relatively small, there is an SPNE where it is optimal for individuals to exhaust the resource, 341 
which is established in the Supplementary Information. Here we demonstrate the SPNEs for our 342 
specific parameterization. The level of effort, ݁௜௧, exerted by individual i at time t is equivalent to 343 
the number of group tokens extracted in the experiment.  The maximum effort,	݁̅, is the total 344 
amount of effort the participant has available to extract from the group account. If ߚ > ఛ(௡ିଵ)௪ഥିఛ  345 
and ߬ ≤ ݁̅ the SPNE decision rule is such that we retrieve a set of decision rules that are 346 
dependent on the size of the stock in the previous round.  The set of decision rules are: choose 347 
݁௜௧ = ݁̅ if the resource stock is	ݓ௧ିଵ ≥ ݊݁̅ + ߬; ݁௜௧ = ௪೟షభିఛ௡  if ݓ௧ିଵ ∈ ሾ߬, ݊݁̅ + ߬) ;  ݁௜௧ =
௪೟షభ
௡  if 348 
ݓ௧ିଵ < ߬; ݁௜௧ = min ቄ݁̅, ௪೟షభ௡ ቅ if ݓ௧ିଵ < ݊݁̅ + ߬.  These results indicate the symmetric stock 349 
specific extraction paths by all participants of a group and mimic the social planner’s extraction 350 
path.  These rules indicate that when the regrowth rate of the stock is relatively high, participants 351 
have an incentive to maintain the resource in order to reap the benefits of future periods of the 352 
stock and the growth of that stock.  When the regrowth rate is relatively small and ߚ < ఛ(௡ିଵ)௪ഥିఛ  353 
and ߬ ≤ ݁̅ then the optimal decision rule is to extract	݁௜௧ = min	{݁̅, ௪௡}.  This extraction path 354 
drives the stock to extinction and is similar to the Nash Equilibrium in the prisoner’s dilemma 355 
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game. The proof of the optimal decision rule for our experiment can be found in the 356 
Supplementary Notes of our SI. In our parameterization, with a low regrowth rate of the stock, 357 
the SPNE decision rule is to extract	݁௜௧ = min	{݁̅, ௪௡}. Though multiple equilibria can exist, 358 
invoking the Folk Theorem (41), if subjects are sufficiently patient the SPNE can coincide with 359 
the social optimal path of extraction. Through the lens of SHH, the Folk Theorem could 360 
operationalize strategic cooperation because individuals can maximize their own payoffs through 361 
cooperation. This is true if individuals are patient and expect future gains in later time periods 362 
provided others cooperate, as current period cooperative decisions are more likely to sustain later 363 
cooperation. For certain values of the parameters	ߚ,	߬, and n the selfish SPNE could also 364 
coincide with the socially optimal strategy. For instance, when regrowth of the group account is 365 
relatively high the private benefits from cooperating with group members can outweigh the 366 
private benefits from extracting the resource to collapse, therefore creating a game where social 367 
cooperation and the SPNE are equivalent. 368 
 In our experiment, the group account starts with 360 tokens in it and each group token 369 
extracted is subtracted from the total amount of tokens in the account. After each round of 370 
decision making, the resource stock grows according to the formula (360 - X)/4 tokens, where X 371 
is the stock of group tokens. Therefore, at the beginning of the next period, there will be X + 372 
(360 - X)/4 tokens in the group account. If the total number of tokens in the group account ever 373 
falls to fewer than 30 tokens, the threshold	߬, the group account will cease to replenish. 374 
 375 
Econometric Methodology  376 
Survival analysis is the appropriate tool to analyse the time to exhaustion of the group account. 377 
Ordinary linear regression would require that the group exhaustion times be transformed to 378 
account for their strictly positive values and for the censoring of the data. Therefore, survival 379 
analysis is more appropriate in our context rather than ordinary linear regression (44). 380 
The semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards regression describes the dependence of 381 
failure risk at any time, t, on the covariates in the regression (41). The Cox model is popular, 382 
flexible, and does not assume specific probability distributions until events occur, leading to the 383 
advantage of not needing to parameterize time dependency (43). The Cox proportional hazards 384 
model is the most commonly used modeling procedure for survival/censored data and covariates. 385 
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In the Cox proportional hazards model, ܨ(ݐ) is the survivor function,	ܨ(ݐ) = ܲݎ	(ݐ ≤ ܶ) 386 
and ߣ(ݐ) is the hazard at time t, where	ߣ(ݐ) = lim∆௧→ஶ ୔୰	(௧ஸ்ழ௧ା∆௧|்ஸ௧)∆௧ = ݂(ܺߚ).  We can use a 387 
set of k covariates in X and recover the coefficients of vector ߚ which tell us about the hazard of 388 
failure for a specific covariate. The hazard rate is ߣ(ݐ|ܺ) = ߣ଴(ݐ)݁௑ఉ, where ߚ is a px1 vector of 389 
unknown coefficients and ߣ଴(ݐ) is an unknown function for the baseline cumulative hazard 390 
function when X=0. The hazard ratio is thus	ߣ(ݐ)/ߣ଴(ݐ) and	݈݊ ቀ ఒ(௧)ఒబ(௧)ቁ = ߚܺ. This holds for all 391 
individuals so that ݈݊ ఒ೔(௧)ఒೕ(௧)=	ߚ( ௝ܺ − ௜ܺ) for individuals i and j. 392 
In the Cox model, baseline hazard rates vary over time, but the hazards for different 393 
covariate values are assumed to be proportional or constant over time. The proportions are also 394 
assumed to hold for all periods of t and between all individuals (42). The Cox proportional 395 
hazards model implies that an independent variable shifts the hazard by a factor of 396 
proportionality. This time invariant proportionality assumption implies that the size of that effect 397 
remains the same irrespective of when it occurs. If this assumption is violated, the outcomes can 398 
be significantly biased coefficient estimates (and reduced power from significance tests, leading 399 
to inefficient estimates) and therefore overestimated or underestimated variable impacts (42).  400 
We test for proportionality using Schoenfeld and Deviance residuals and find that for our data 401 
the proportionality assumption holds. 402 
 We use the Breslow approximation to handle ties in event times. It is the simplest 403 
approximation to the probability that an individual had an event, given that an event occurred at 404 
that time. While it is the simplest, it also the most conservatively biased (it estimates coefficients 405 
too close to zero) and was chosen for such (44). In addition, we cluster standard errors in our 406 
analysis by the unit of observation.  Observations at the individual subject level can have errors 407 
which are correlated and therefore clustering is a common technique for statistical inference of 408 
the significance of the recovered coefficients.   409 
 In Table 2 we present ordinary linear regressions of the deviation of extraction decisions 410 
to the social optimal extraction decision, including a series of controls.  The dependent variable 411 
is constructed to compare the observed extraction to a stock dependent decision which is deemed 412 
cooperative and socially optimal. We define this difference 413 
as	ܦ݂݅ ௜݂௧ = ܵ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ	ܱ݌ݐ݈݅݉ܽ	ܧݔݐݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊௜௧ − ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܧݔݐݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊௜௧. This is then used in 414 
equation (1) to evaluate the coefficient on the treatment effect of time pressure. 415 
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 416 
ܦ݂݅ ௜݂௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܲݎ݁ݏݏݑݎ݁௜ +	ߚଶ…௞ ௜ܺ௧,ଶ…௞ + ߝ௜௧						(1) 
 417 
Equation 1 includes k covariates to control for other factors that affect decisions such as round in 418 
the experiment, gender of the participant, cycle, the experience with economic experiments of 419 
participants, undergraduate major, and CRT score. We cluster standard errors in our analysis by 420 
subject to adjust for correlation of observations by subject in the experiment.  The interpretation 421 
of negative coefficient of time pressure is that the effect of the time pressure treatment increased 422 
extraction from the group account and participants behaved more selfishly compared to the 423 
control group.  424 
 425 
Data Availability 426 
The experimental data and code are freely available and have been deposited in figshare at 427 
https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5965462.v1. 428 
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 570 
Table 1: Survival Analysis 
 Dependent variable: 
 Failure of Group Account 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Pressure 0.539*** 0.700*** 0.788*** 
 (0.134) (0.149) (0.171) 
Female  0.214 0.334** 
  (0.133) (0.164) 
# of previous experiments  -0.005 0.011 
  (0.084) (0.085) 
UG major: biology  -0.412** -0.423* 
  (0.180) (0.220) 
UG major: environmental economics  -0.001 -0.109 
  (0.179) (0.209) 
Cycle 2  -0.164 -0.158 
  (0.165) (0.198) 
Cycle 3  -0.540*** -0.530** 
  (0.181) (0.209) 
% CRT Correct   -0.583* 
   (0.299) 
Observations 2,148 2,148 1,545 
Log pseudolikelihood -1,000 -993 -688 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Cox proportional hazard model results, with stock failure as the event of interest. 
Clustered standard errors by participant, cycle, and session are in parentheses. Column (1) and (2) contain the full 
sample of all individuals while column (3) restricts the sample to include only individuals with a CRT score. “UG 
major:” indicates the participant’s area of study.  
 
 571 
 572 
 573 
 574 
 575 
 576 
 577 
 578 
 579 
 
 
22
Table 2: Extraction Behaviour 
 Dependent variable: 
 (SO Extraction – Observed Extraction) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Pressure -1.079 -4.973* -6.695** 
 (2.502) (2.831) (3.088) 
Female  -3.431 -6.163* 
  (2.781) (3.311) 
# of previous experiments  1.633 1.627 
  (1.633) (1.555) 
UG major: biology  2.269 3.509 
  (2.665) (3.045) 
UG major: environmental economics  -4.078 -5.184 
  (3.883) (4.578) 
Cycle 2  2.432 2.105 
  (1.626) (1.799) 
Cycle 3  2.979* 2.443 
  (1.720) (2.052) 
Round  -1.781*** -1.731*** 
  (0.196) (0.231) 
% CRT Correct   -0.087 
   (6.841) 
Observations 1,952 1,952 1,400 
R-squared 0.000 0.107 0.126 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Ordinary least squares regression. Clustered standard errors by participant are in 
parentheses. Groups with participants who do not enter a decision within the time constraint are excluded from the 
analysis. Column (1) and (2) contains the full sample of all individuals while column (3) restricts the sample to 
include only individuals with a CRT score. “UG major:” indicates the participant’s area of study.  
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Figure 1 Legend 588 
Fig. 1: A graph showing the average size of the group account (n=168 for no time pressure treatment and n=116 for 589 
the time pressure treatment) at the beginning of each period (the stock size left after the previous period with the 590 
addition of regrown stock). The black dashed line indicates the predicted stock sizes were the groups behaving as a 591 
social planner would.  The blue dashed line indicates the stock path if all the participants are in a competitive 592 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. 593 
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